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MOBILE HOMES: ZONING AND TAXATION
Richard W. Bartket and Hilda R. Gage#-
In recent years zoning, as a tool of urban planning, has been under
increasing attack.' Some criticism has been directed at the concept of
zoning as such, or at least at its practice of fostering single-use districts.
The main thrust of the criticism, however, has been levelled against
the application of zoning by local units of government. The term
"economic zoning" has acquired a rather unpleasant connotation.
Most writing has concentrated on four aspects or devices of eco-
nomic zoning: minimum floor space standards,2 minimum acreage
- Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1954, J.D. 1956, University of
Washington; LL.M. 1967, Yale University.
-" Senior law student, Wayne State University. B.A. 1960, M.A. 1962, University of
Michigan.
1. See, e.g., Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning:
Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1 U. ToEmo L. REv. 65 (1969); Bowe, Regional Planning
versus Decentralized Land-Use controls-Zoning for the Megalopolis, 18 DEPAUL L. RFv.
144 (1968); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Note, Zoning-A Comprehensive Study of Problems
and Solutions, 14 N.Y.L.F. 77, 159-70 (1968).
2 The most famous, or infamous, case, depending on one's point of view in this area,
is Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal
dismissed, 344 US. 919 (1953). For a discussion of this case and of the broader issues
involved, see Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66
HARv. L. RFv. 1051 (1953); Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum
Space Requirements, 67 HARV. L. REv. 967 (1954); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for
Whorn-In Brief Reply, 67 HAv. L. REv. 986 (1954). For an excellent recent reevaluation
of the problem, see Sager, supra note 1, at 780-98; Williams & Wacks, Segregation of
Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisted, 1969 Wis. L. Rlv.
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standards,3 separation of districts for different types of housing,4 and
elimination of multiple housing units.5 Rather surprisingly, very little
has been written concerning zoning with respect to mobile homes.0
The subject is a fascinating one because mobile homes present peculiar
problems and challenges to the utilization of urban land. It is also
timely because recent technological developments in the field of pre-
fabrication and modular construction may suggest approaches and
alternatives to the solution, or partial solution, of the problems of the
housing of low-income families. In many places, however, zoning may
be a stumbling block in the path of such experiments.
This article will explore the approaches to the problem of mobile
homes in both public and private zoning. It will also address the ques-
tion of the proper taxation of mobile homes. Lighter taxation of
mobile homes than of conventional housing has been frequently used
3 See, e.g., Aloi, Goldberg & White, supra note 1, at 77-79; Bowe, supra note 1, at
150-54; Sager, supra note 1, at 796-98; Note, Snob Zoning-A Look at the Economic and
Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 507 (1964). For a discussion
of the economic impact of minimum acreage standards, in addition to other policy con-
siderations, see Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE LJ. 1418 (1969).
4 See, e.g., D. MANDELKER, CONTROLLING PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS (1966):
Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 3-170 (1965).
5 See, e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 1040 (1963); Bowe, supra note 1, at 154-56; Symposium, Apartments in
Suburbia: Local Responsibility and Judicial Restraint, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 344-432 (1964).
o The law review writing, with two exceptions, seems to have been done by students:
Carter, Problems in the Regulation and Taxation of Mobile Homes, 48 IowA L. REV. 16
(1962) (this article is concerned not only with zoning but with other aspects of regulation
as well); Eshelman, Municipal Regulation of House Trailers in Pennsylvania, 66 Dica. L.
REV. 301 (1962); Note, Trailer Parks vs. The Municipal Police Power, 34 CONN. B.J. 285
(1960); Note, Municipal Regulation and Taxation of Trailers and Trailer Camps Under
Pennsylvania Law, 57 DICK. L. REV. 338 (1953); Note, Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13
SYRACUsE L. REv. 125 (1961) (dealing with certain aspects of zoning and taxation); Note,
Regulation and Taxation of House Trailers, 22 U. Ci. L. REV. 738 (1955) (an excellent
short treatment of the law up to that point in time); Note, Toward an Equitable and
Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation, 71 YAL LJ. 702 (1962) (although pri-
marily concerned with taxation this Note explores the interrelationship between taxes
and regulation of mobile homes and their acceptance in a community); 61 MICH. L.
REv. 1010 (1963); 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 659 (1963). There axe two specialized books
in the area: B. HoDEs & G. RoDaRsoN, THE LAw OF MOBILE HoMAs (2d ed. 1964) [herein-
after cited as HoDEs & ROBEaSON] (this work does little more than list the cases and give
brief synopses of them), and E. BARTEY & F. BAIR, MOBILE HOME PAMKS AND COMPREIIEN-
sIVE CoMmINITY PLANNING (1960) [hereinafter cited as BARTLEY & BAIR] (this book, al-
though written by non-lawyers and not primarily concerned with legal questions, has
some excellent discussions of the problems involved). The problems are also mentioned
in the standard texts on zoning and municipal corporations: see, e.g., 7 E. McQuiLLIN,
THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL COR PORATONS § 24.564 (3d rev. ed. J. Latta 1968); 1 A. RATHKOPF,
THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 17 (3d ed. 1960). See also Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 234
(1964); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 277 (1962); Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 774 (1952).
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as an excuse for excluding mobile homes altogether. It is our hope that
we will start a wider discussion which may result in needed change.
I
THE MOBILE HOME
The term "trailer" has been replaced by "mobile home." The
change in usage was undoubtedly motivated by a desire to avoid con-
notations attached to the former term and to reflect the transformations
in the product itself. In fact, this new term is rapidly losing its descrip-
tive value, since the so-called mobile home is increasingly shedding its
mobility.7 A few examples may illustrate the change.
When, in 1942, the Supreine Court of Ohio discussed trailers used
for family living it said:
[T~he evidence discloses that the average trailer is approximately
7 feet in width and 17 feet in length, thus having a floor area of
but 119 square feet, with as many as five people living therein.
No trailer is equipped with a toilet or shower.8
By 1960 the average mobile home had a length in excess of forty
feet and a width of ten feet, and the industry was beginning to talk of
twelve feet width.9 The twelve-foot-wide trailer was introduced in
1962, and by 1965 such trailers, together with the so-called double wide
units, two units placed side-by-side, accounted for over half of the
sales.10 The latest statistics for a full year, showing the shipments of
mobile homes made in 1968, indicate that the overwhelming majority
were twelve feet in width (in certain parts of the country more than
ninety percent of those delivered) and that more than half of the units
7 The title and contents of an article bear this out. McKeever, The Motionless
Mobile Home-The Trailer Problem in Community Development, 19 URBAN LAND, April
1960, at 1. See Where Housing Market Has Lots of Life, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 3, 1966, at 148,
suggesting the term "relocatable housing." See also'State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 212, 215,
449 P.2d 806, 808-09 (1969).
8 Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 487-88, 40 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1942).
By contrast, a commentator writing twenty years later said:
The modem house trailer, more appropriately known as a mobilehome,
is a large, compact, completely equipped apartment on wheels. It includes
sleeping, cooking, washing and sanitation facilities. It is a unit independent of
outside facilities except for water, gas and electric supply, and sewage disposal.
The mobilehome is 10 or 12 feet wide, usually 50 or 55 feet in length, and can
be moved only by special equipment.
Eshelman, supra note 6, at 301.
9 BARLEY & BAiR 6; HOnEs & ROBERSON 2.
10 Where Housing Market Has Lots of Life, Bus. W=-a, Sept. 3, 1966, at 150.
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were sixty feet or more in length.11 Currently the industry is advertising
twenty-four-foot-wide units (twenty-four feet wide when assembled")
and two-story mobile homes with 1,100 square feet of living space. 13
Considerable changes have taken place in the design and concept
of the trailer or mobile home park.'4 From the earlier stereotype of
the shantytown or slum on wheels of the 1930's and the World War II
years,15 trailer parks have developed into attractive permanent residen-
tial communities, with appropriate landscaping and community ser-
vices.' 6 In fact, a vertical mobile home park is being erected in Capis-
trano Beach, California, on the condominium principle. The units
will be hoisted by crane onto platforms and the residents will have
access to them by means of elevators. The platforms are designed in
such a way that the units will have a balcony on two sides.1
7
Although mobile homes are not yet included in the housing
statistics, they play an increasingly important'role in the field. In 1953
the mobile home industry produced approximately 100,000 units with
a value of $100,000,000.18 This increased to 120,000 units in 1956 and
to 223,000 units in 1963.19 In 1968 the industry produced over 350,000
units and the total value of its output approached $3,000,000,000.20
11 Mobile Home Shipments to Dealers by Region During 1968, 20 MOBILE HOME
RECREATIONAL VEHIcLE DEALER, March 20, 1969, at 80-85. For the latest figures see Mobile
Home Deliveries to Dealers by Region For the Third Quarter of 1969, 20 MOBILE HOME
RECREATIONAL VEHICLE DE.ALER, Dec. 5, 1969, at 44-55.
12 Id., Feb. 20, 1969, at 36.
13 Id., Jan. 5, 1969, at 6. For latest style changes and elevations approximating the
appearance of conventional homes, see Innovations in Design, id., Nov. 20, 1969, at 34-35.
14 BARTEY & BAIR 12-16; Fogarty, Trailer parks: the wheeled suburbs, 111 ARCIIt-
TEcruRAL F., July 1959, at 127; French & Hadden, An Analysis of the Distribution and
Characteristics of Mobile Homes in America, 41 LAND EcON. 131 (1965).
15 HoDEs & ROBERSON 1-2; Note, Towards an Equitable and Workable Program of
Mobile Home Taxation, 71 YALE L.J. 702-03 (1962).
16 BARTLEY & BAIR 135-40; French & Hadden, supra note 14; cf. Berney & Larson,
Micro-Analysis of Mobile Home Characteristics with Implications for Tax Policy, 42 LAND
ECON. 453, 455 (1966). The Macomb County Planning Commission has recently published
a study of mobile homes in the county, which reaches conclusions very similar to those
of the earlier and broader studies. MOBILE HOME PARKS, MACOMB COUNTY, MICHIGAN i
(1969) [hereinafter cited as MACOMB STUDY]. Macomb County forms a part of the Detroit
metropolitan area. However, as a result of restrictive policies there is at present in certain
areas an acute shortage of parks, which, because of the absence of competitive forces,
produces a deterioration of services. See, e.g., The Detroit News, Aug. 26, 1969, at 1-D,
col. 1.
17 Carriage House: Skyscraper Park Throws Out Rule Book, 16 MOBILE HOME PARK
MANAGEMENT, Sept. 1968, at 30.
18 Note, Municipal Regulation and Taxation of Trailers and Trailer Camps Under
Pennsylvania Law, 57 DICK. L. Rxv. 338 (1953).
19 HODEs & RoBERsON 4.
20 Greenleaf, Industry Capabilities, 20 MOBII.E HOME RECREATIONAL VEHICLE DEALER,
March 20, 1969, at 42.
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Furthermore, techniques developed by the mobile home industry are
being experimented with in connection with "piggy back" or pre-
fabricated housing, which is constructed in the factory in modular form,
delivered to the site on flatbeds, and assembled into multi-story
structures.21
Recent studies also indicate that the characteristics of mobile
home owners no longer fit the earlier stereotypes. 22 For instance, the
1960 census data indicate that the number of children per household
for the mobile home population is lower than that for the country at
large. Similarly, in terms of income and assets, they approximate the
national average. Nevertheless, many of the early preconceptions are
still accepted at face value and hamper an evaluation of the problems
involved.
Mobile homes increasingly provide the new low-cost housing be-
ing built in the country.23 With the conventional $10,000 home a thing
of the past,24 mobile homes are filling the vacuum. The tremendous
21 The Department of Housing and Urban Development undertook a pilot project
in "piggyback" housing in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The modules were fully manufactured,
using the production techniques of the mobile homes industry, brought to the construc-
tion site on flatbeds, and stacked upon each other by cranes. 3 HUD ANN. Rxs'. 95 (1967).
For a discussion of some later "piggyback" projects in Detroit, Boston, and Rochester, see
"Instant Housing," 25 J. HousING, Oct. 1968, at 467. The possibilities of assembly-line
housing were recently discussed at a conference in Detroit. The Detroit News, March 6,
1969, at 20-C, col. 1. Fruehauf Corporation, long a leader in the field of truck trailers and
freight containers, recently announced plans to produce modular homes. The Detroit
News, May 2, 1969, at 20-C, col. 1. See also Keith, Factory-Built Housing Cuts On-Site
Work to Two Days, LAwvas TrrrL NEws, Oct. 1969, at 3 (Mich. ed.).
22 HODEs 9- ROBERSON 4 (average annual income of mobile home resident exceeded
national average in 1959); see French & Hadden, supra note 14, at 138:
For one thing, rather than placing an increased burden on community
facilities, trailer inhabitants may actually contribute more to a community than
they receive from it. Their demands for schools appear to be disproportionately
low. Streets and sewers may be developed to a considerable extent by trailer
park owners and, in some cases, trash disposal may be handled privately.
For a similar conclusion see MACOMB STUDY 31-32.
23 "Now, that is the reason for the increase in the mobile home business, because
the mobile home is today the only means by which these low- and moderate-income
people can afford to buy a house." Mortgage Credit, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 159 (1967) (statement of Frank P. Flynn, Jr.). Mobile homes accounted for 75%
of the sales of homes costing less than $13,000. 130 FiNANcAL WORLD, Sept. 4, 1968, at 20.
See also Aiman, Mobile Homes: Market for Mini Houses is Big, 202 IRON AGE, Sept. 5,
1968, at 56.
24 See Hearings, supra note 23, at 159. See also Berger, Homeownership for Lower
Income Families: The 1968 Housing Act's "Cruel Hoax," 2 CONN. L. REv. 30, 31-33 (1969).
A group of Negro businessmen in Detroit formed a construction company that claims
that it can produce and sell conventional houses for $10,000. The Detroit News, Jan. 26,
1969, at I-A, col. 2. It is too early to determine what contribution toward solving the
low-income housing problem they can make, but the development will be watched with
interest by all students of housing.
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decrease in home construction in 196625 did not affect the mobile
home industry.26 The same phenomenon seems to be developing in
1969.27 As usual there is a lag between the facts of life and their official
acceptance. Thus, new mobile homes are not reflected in the statistics
of housing starts, distorting the picture, although the incongruity is
becoming more and more apparent.28 The new attitude was voiced
recently, in somewhat exaggerated terms, by Pierre Rinfret, consulting
economist and economic advisor to President Nixon during the 1968
campaign, as follows:
The answer is very simple. The housing industry, for example,
deserves disaster. And it is getting it. We are developing a new
industry that the stock market has just discovered. I discovered it
three years ago. I said then that here is an answer to housing in the
United States. It's called mobile homes. For six thousand dollars
I can produce an eight-by-twenty-foot home, put it on six concrete
blocks and on the land, and it will cost the buyer twenty-five
dollars a month. And that is better housing than I can get from
trade-union construction for twenty thousand dollars. So if con-
ventional housing goes under, I will be delighted, because I have
the alternative.29
II
THE MOBILE HOME AND PUBLIC ZONING
Zoning as an element of police power is supposed to serve the ends
of public health, safety, and morals. It is well known that in practice
these lofty ideals are seldom observed, since zoning is performed by
25 Newman, The Low-Cost Housing Market, 89 MONTHLY LAB. RaV. 1362 (1966).
For a discussion of the mortgage financing "crisis" of 1966, see Hearings, supra note 23,
at 72; Klaman, Public/Private Approaches to Urban Mortgage and Housing Problems,
32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 250 (1967).
26 Aiman, supra note 23, at 56; Newman, supra note 25, at 1363; Where Housing
Market Has Lots of Life, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 3, 1966, at 148.
27 Greenleaf, supra note 20, at 42. For an evaluation of developments in mid-1969,
see Wall St. J., July 11, 1969, at 1, col. 6, and for a later summary see Mayer, Mobilpe
Homes Move Into the Breach, FORTUNE, March 1970, at 126.
28 Thus in a staff memorandum prepared for the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System answering questions presented by the Commission on Mortgage and
Interest Rates, the following is found in a discussion of the availability of funds to meet
the national housing goals: "What allowance in either the regular or subsidized market
is to be made for lower-priced mobile homes, which do not count as starts but do provide
shelter?" Housing Production and Finance, 55 FE. Ras. BULL., March 1969, at 228.
29 II THE CE.TrR MAGAZINE, May 1969, at 65-66. Mr. Rinfret made this comment
during a round table discussion at a seminar sponsored by the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions held in New York City on February 5, 1969.
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local units of government and is responsive to local sentiments and
prejudices. Elected officials are closely attuned to the thinking of the
community and translate its desires, expressed or implied, into the
paragraphs of ordinances.30 In the past, mobile home dwellers have
been the stepchildren of zoning legislation."1 Responding to the old
stereotype of a shantytown on wheels, many municipalities have tried
either to exclude mobile homes altogether3 2 or to subject them to such
stringent and onerous provisions as to discourage any attempt at mobile
home living within their borders.38
The picture is complicated by the interaction of judicial decision
and legislative response. 34 The cases themselves may be categorized in
any number of ways, trying to fit them into neat little slots with their
nice and shiny labels. Such attempts have been made in the past3 5 and
30 For elaboration and examples of such practices, see R. BABCOCK, Tm ZONING GAME
158-85 (1966); Aloi, Goldberg & White, supra note 1, at 67, 74-80; Sager, supra note 1, at
780-82.
81 Babcock calls trailer parks "everyone's pariah." BABcoCK, supra note 30, at 137.
See also C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGY AND TAcTicS IN MUNICIPAL ZONING 140 (1969).
32 E.g., Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Board of Selectmen of
Wrentham v. Monson, - Mass. -, 247 N.E.2d 364 (1969); Vickers v. Township of
Gloucester, 37 NJ. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962); Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29
N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959); Midgarden v. Grand Forks, 79 N.D. 18, 54 N.W.2d 659
(1952); cf. A & P Mobilehome Court, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 21 Conn. Supp. 275, 154
A.2d 243 (1959); Rezler v. Village of Riverside, 28 Ill. 2d 142, 190 N.E.2d 706 (1963).
33 E.g., Karen v. Town of East Haddam, 146 Conn. 720, 155 A.2d 921 (1959) (70-day
limitation on the stay of mobile homes in trailer parks not unreasonable or arbitrary);
Rezler v. Village of Riverside, 28 IUI. 2d 142, 190 N.E.2d 706 (1963) (limitation to two
consecutive days in any calendar month with a cumulative limitation of 30 days a year
not unreasonable); Spitler v. Town of Munster, 214 Ind. 75, 14 N.E.2d 579 (1938) (length
of stay in "tourist camps" limited to 30 days); Board of Selectmen of Wrentham v.
Monson, - Mass. -, 247 N.E.2d 364 (1969) (both total prohibition and limitation of
stay to 30 days approved inferentially); Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805
(1939), appeal dismissed, 309 .U.S. 620 (1940) (city ordinance prohibiting parking of
occupied trailers in trailer parks for periods longer than 90 days in any 12 months up-
held); Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 40 N.E.2d 925 (1942) (length of
stay of house trailers in trailer parks within the village limited to 60 days). For citation
to additional cases and further discussion of such devices, see Carter, supra note 6, at
25-28.
34 For example, after the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Cady v. Detroit,
289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 620 (1940), the Michigan
Legislature adopted Public Act 143 of 1939 (repealed 1959), which was construed to de-
prive municipalities of the powers to limit the stay of trailers in licensed parks (Richards
v. Pontiac, 805 Mich. 666, 9 N.W.2d 885 (1943)), but not outside of licensed parks (Loose
v. Battle Creek, 309 Mich. 1, 14 N.W.2d 554 (1944)). For a discussion of the Ohio ex-
perience, see Carter, supra note 6, at 26-27.
35 See, e.g., HODES & RoaaSoN 153-200; Carter, supra note 6, at 19-46 (this article
has a comprehensive collection of cases decided up to the time of its publication); Note,
Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 125, 128-33 (1961).
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will not be repeated here. This article is concerned with more funda-
mental questions: how far should a landowner be compelled to adjust
his use of his property and mode of life to the wishes, ideas, or prej-
udices of his neighbors, and whether the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution is involved when a municipality decides to exclude
a certain group of people (those who by choice or necessity decide to
reside in mobile homes) from its borders.
At the threshold, zoning for or against mobile homes involves two
distinct, although interrelated, problems. The first is whether mobile
homes may be deposited on permanent foundations on residential lots
zoned for single-family dwellings. This problem involves the wording
of the particular ordinances involved, and was so analyzed in the past.8 6
But more recent opinions,3 particularly that of the Supreme Court of
Washington in State v. Work,38 cast doubt on this proposition and sug-
gest that broader and more fundamental issues are involved.
The second problem is the assertion that mobile homes belong
only in mobile home parks, which should be subjected to appropriate
governmental regulation. 9 This issue is highly debatable, particularly
as the units are increasingly less mobile and more home, and some as-
pects of the problem will be discussed below. 40 What is, however, of
immediate interest is the nature of a trailer park as such. Most zoning
ordinances dealing with mobile home parks or, as they are still called,
"trailer" parks, treat them as commercial ventures, as they are, and draw
from this the unjustifiable conclusion that they belong in a commercially
zoned area.41 While ownership and operation of the mobile home park
may very well be a business, and should be taxed, treated, and regulated
as such, living in a mobile home is not a business. It does not differ in
kind or degree from living in any other kind of dwelling. This approach
is similar to saying that because the ownership and operation of an
apartment house is a business, apartment houses belong only in com-
mercial or industrial zones.
To push the analogy a little bit further, it could be asked whether
the same authorities would classify a subdivision, developed with con-
36 Compare Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956),
with Sioux Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70 N.W.2d 62 (1955).
37 Douglass Township v. Badman, 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88 (1965); Lescault v.
Zoning Bd. of Cumberland, 91 R.I. 277, 162 A.2d 807 (1960); In re Wiley, 120 Vt. 359, 140
A.2d 11 (1958).
8 75 Wash. 2d 212, 449 P.2d 806 (1969).
39 For a discussion of arguments in favor of this proposition, see BARTLEY & BAr
12-13; Carter, supra note 6, at 33-35.
40 Text at notes 81-104 infra.
41 See, e.g., New Orleans v. Louviere, 52 So. 2d 751 (La. App. 1951). See generally
BARTLEY & BArn 75-80; HODEs & RoBEasON 156-62; MACOMB STUDY 11-12.
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ventionally built, single-family residences but owned by an investor
who rented them, as a business, so that the development could take
place only in a commercial or, worse still, an industrial zone. While
this kind of development is not common, it is becoming increasingly
popular in certain parts of the country to retain fee title to the land
of a subdivision and to lease the lots on long-term leases to prospective
homeowners, who then construct houses that they own. 42 Again the
question could then be asked, "Is not the owning of such a subdivision
and collection of rent a business?", and an immediate conclusion could
be drawn that therefore this should not be a residential but a commer-
cial or industrial zone. The fact that a subdivision is organized and
developed as a commercial venture does not cause anybody to treat it,
as far as the people who reside there are concerned, as a business. The
mistake is in looking not at the primary purpose for which people
frequent and use an area as a touchstone for the determination of its
designation, but at the incidental profitability of the area to someone.
A. A Home or a Vehicle-Is This Really a Question of Semantics?
One of the guises under which the problem of mobile homes
versus zoning ordinances has come to the attention of the courts is in
connection with lot owners' bringing mobile homes on lots and placing
them there more or less permanently.43 Axles and wheels are often re-
moved and the mobile home is put on a cinder or concrete block
foundation. It is also attached to utilities, such as electricity, gas, water,
and sewers. The question that may then arise is whether such homes
violate the provisions of the local ordinance limiting the area to single-
family residences, 44 or, essentially the same problem, whether they are
subject to all the applicable requirements of the ordinance, such as
minimum lot size,45 minimum floor area,46 the requirements relating to
42 For a discussion of this kind of residential development in Orange County,
California, see G. LEFcoE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAw 1068 (1966).
43 See discussion in Carter, supra note 6, at 35-37.
44 E.g., Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962);
Commonwealth v. Flannery, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 680 (1954); Sioux Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D.
548, 70 N.W.2d 62 (1955).
45 County of Will v. Stanfill, 7 I1. App. 2d 52, 129 N.E.2d 46 (1955). The area was
zoned R-2 with a minimum lot requirement of 7,260 square feet. Defendants placed
trailers on much smaller lots and connected them to utilities. The court held that trailers
were "erected" within the meaning of the ordinance and violated minimum lot size
requirements.
46 Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga. App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951) (300 square foot
trailer violated requirement of minimum floor space of 700 square feet prescribed by
zoning ordinance); Town of Huntington v. Transon, 43 Misc. 2d 912, 252 N.Y.S.2d 576
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (trailer on foundation a building within zoning ordinance and subject to
minimum floor area requirement of 800 square feet); Corning v. Town of Ontario, 204
Misc. 38, 121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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side yards,47 and so on.48 In this connection, it is very easy to treat the
whole problem as one of semantics, and one writer has so approached it.
After discussing the cases decided up to that point, he concludes a section
of his article by admonishing municipal authorities that "[t]he problems
referred to may best be solved by amending existing zoning ordinances
so as to spell out the use districts in which mobile homes and mobile
home parks are to be permitted." 49
The issue is more fundamental and is not solved by the addition
of a couple of sentences to an ordinance. What is involved is a question
of the freedom of an owner to use his property in any way he sees fit,
so long as the use is not illegal or violative of the rights of others. To
say at this point that a municipality may, by enacting an ordinance
prescribing an architectural design, make the use of any other design
illegal is to beg the question or assume the answer. The problem is one
of equal protection under the provisions of the Federal Constitution
and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. 50 As a matter of
policy the question is simply this: Will the individual homeowner be
permitted to live in a manner that satisfies his desires or must he con-
form to the esthetic tastes of his neighbors?51
The semantic game of skill, as applied to mobile homes put more
or less permanently on residential lots, takes various guises. In certain
cases, municipalities have argued that such mobile homes are "build-
ings" or "single-family dwellings" within the meaning of the ordinance,
and because they do not meet all the requirements as to side yards,
size, or any other feature, the mobile homes are illegal.5 2 In those cases
47 See State ex rel. Mooris v. Nashville, 207 Tenn. 672, 343 S.W.2d 847 (1961). This
case involved the right to a permit on a large back lot in a commercial zone for 24
trailers. The reasoning of the court is not well articulated, but the opinion mentions,
among other things, that the placement of the trailers would have violated side yard
requirements of the zoning ordinance.
48 Lower Merion Township v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35 (1946) (a
trailer on a foundation is a building within the meaning of the ordinance and subject to
all its requirements).
49 Carter, supra note 6, at 37.
50 For a discussion of equal protection implications of exclusionary zoning, see Aloi,
Goldberg & White, supra note 1, at 96-102; Sager, supra note 1, at 780-800.
51 The reading of two recent cases decided by the courts of appeal of Ohio and
Illinois, in respect to the approval of building plans by an architectural board of review,
is instructive. Compare Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192
N.E.2d 74 (1963), with Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 IlM. App. 2d
218, 244 N.E.2d 369 (1968). See also Piscitelli v. Township of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J.
Super. 589, 248 A.2d 274 (1968); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955); Comment, Validity Rules Concerning Public Zoning
and Private Covenants: A Comparison and Critique, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 409, 419-24 (1966).
52 Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga. App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951); County of Will v.
Stanfill, 7 Ill. App. 2d 52, 129 NE.2d 46 (1955); Town of Huntington v. Transon, 43
Misc. 2d 912, 252 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Corning v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38,
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the owners just as strenuously have claimed that their structures are
not buildings but vehicles, and therefore outside the purview of the
ordinance. In other cases the roles are reversed, the municipal author-
ides arguing that the structures are vehicles, trailers, or what have you,
and therefore illegal under the zoning provisions, the owners replying
with equal vigor that the structures are buildings fully complying with
the zoning and building codes involved.5 3 Other cases turn on such
interesting points as whether the mobile home is "parked" on the lot or
whether it is "erected" thereon.54 The reported decisions proceed in all
conceivable directions. To a certain extent they seem to be the product
of the time of decision, the earlier cases being strongly influenced by
the size, construction, and available amenities of the trailers of the
period (such as lack of indoor plumbing, cramped quarters, and similar
limitations). Nevertheless, the recent cases seem to indicate a trend in
the other direction.
The most extreme position excluding mobile homes from single-
family districts seems to have been taken by the Massachusetts courts.55
Their attitude can best be summarized as either "once a trailer, always
a trailer" or "a trailer is a trailer is a trailer."56 The fact that the mobile
121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Lower Merion Township v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572,
46 A.2d 35 (1946).
53 Town of Brewster v. Sherman, 343 Mass. 598, 180 N.E.2d 338 (1962); Town of
Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591,180 N.E.2d 333 (1962); Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert,
334 Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956); Douglass Township v. Badman, 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213
A.2d 88 (1965); Commonwealth v. Flannery, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 680 (1954); Lescault v. Zoning Bd.
of Cumberland, 91 R.I. 277, 162 A.2d 807 (1960); Sioux Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70
N.W.2d 62 (1955); In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958); State v. Work, 75 Wash.
2d 212, 449 P.2d 806 (1969).
54 City of Astoria v. Nothwang, 221 Ore. 452, 351 P.2d 688 (1960). The city had no
zoning ordinance but an ordinance prohibited the parking of trailers. The de-
fendant put a mobile home on her-lot and connected it to water, sewer, and electricity.
It was held that this was not "parking" within the meaning of the ordinance. The
opinion ends with a very broad hint that the city should amend its ordinance. See also
Davis v. Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 16 So. 2d 1 (1943).
55 See Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 170, 174, 200 A.2d 543, 546, 548 (1964); Town
of Brewster v. Sherman, 343 Mass. 598, 180 N.E.2d 338 (1962); Town of Manchester v.
Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962); Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334 Mass.
602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956).
56 "A trailer on wheels, by its very nature, is not adapted for the type of permanent
dwelling use very plainly contemplated by the by-law in using the term 'One-family
detached houses.'" Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 602, 604, 137 N.E.2d 921,
922 (1956).
In ordinary parlance the unit shown in the exhibits will be spoken of as a trailer
or a mobile home, even if it has not been sold with wheels or its wheels have
been taken away, and even if it has been affixed to the land. It looks like a
trailer, has the qualities of a trailer superstructure, and has been built as a
trailer.
Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 596, 180 N.E.2d 333, 337 (1962).
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homes were purchased without wheels to be brought in on flatbeds, or
that the wheels were to be removed and the structures were to be
permanently attached to foundations, landscaped, and in every other
respect made to comply with the applicable zoning ordinances did not
make an impression on the Massachusetts judges. The language in the
appropriate municipal ordinances, excluding from the term "[d]welling
an overnight camp, trailer, or mobile home" 57 or prohibiting the
"[r]esiding in any trailer or tent,'6 was held sufficient to exclude im-
mobilized, permanently attached mobile homes. Such cases lend strong
support to the contentions that the issue is purely one of semantics and
that if the municipality uses strong enough language it will prevail.
Other states have held, with varying degrees of emphasis and under
different factual situations, that mobile homes placed more or less per-
manently on a residential lot still remain trailers and within the pro-
hibition of the ordinance. 59 These courts, as well as the Massachusetts
courts that have focused on whether the structure had ever been a
trailer60 and the fact that it was not very securely attached to the land,6
apparently fail to realize that the phrase "permanently attached to the
land" is a misleading one. The distinctions are of degree, not of kind.
It is common knowledge that conventionally built houses may be moved,
and the spectacle of residences being moved by house movers from one
lot to another is not unknown to our cities. The expression "conven-
tionally constructed" is, of course, one of changing content. The con-
vention in one age may have once been revolutionary. The difficulty
of moving a house to another site seems to be a rather slender reed
on which to lean in deciding a case. 62 The opinions do not tell us at
57 Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 592 n.1, 180 N.E.2d 333, 334 n.1
(1962).
58 Town of Brewster v. Sherman, 343 Mass. 598, 599, 180 N.E.2d 338, 339 (1962).
59 Bixler v. Pierson, 188 So. 2d 681 (Fla. App. 1966); New Orleans v. Louviere, 52
So. 2d 751 (La. App. 1951); People v. Clute, 18 N.Y.2d 999, 224 N.E.2d 734, 278 N.Y.S2d
231 (1966) (memorandum decision); State ex rel. Morris v. Nashville, 207 Tenn. 672, 343
S.W.2d 847 (1961).
60 Town of Brewster v. Sherman, 343 Mass. 598, 180 N.E.2d 338 (1962); Town of
Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962). The trial judge in Phillips
very properly characterized the issue as whether something once denominated a mobile
home forever remains such and held to the contrary, saying that having shed its mobility,
the structure became a single-family dwelling. He was reversed on appeal.
81 Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956). The court
stressed that the trailer remained on its wheels, was not affixed to the land, and could
be moved at any time. However, subsequent language in the opinion, and, of course, the
later Massachusetts cases, make it clear that the presence of a foundation would not have
changed the result.
62 The point is made very forcefully by Judge Van Voorhis, in his dissenting
opinion in People v. Clute, 18 N.Y.2d 999, 224 NE.2d 734, 278 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1966):
No contention is made against appellant that she violated any setback or
area restriction, that there was any sanitary or building code violation or that
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which point a dwelling is "permanently" attached and at which it is
not. Is it a question of the man-hours required to prepare it for moving
or is it a question of the dollars involved? The opinions remain silent.
These attempts remind one of the definition of a fixture attributed to
the late Professor E. H. "Bull" Warren, as "realty with a chattel past
and the fear of a chattel future."63
In the middle of the spectrum are cases in which the municipality
claimed that the structure was a dwelling or building which, however,
did not comply with zoning requirements as to side yards, backyards,
minimum floor space, or some other respect.6 4 While the language used
by the courts, taken at face value, would strongly support the notion
that the question was not purely one of semantics, this is weakened by
the fact that the contention was made by the municipalities passing the
ordinances. Therefore, the courts were proceeding from the assumption
that the body which had passed the legislation was also interpreting it,
and it is very difficult to say whether the same result would have been
reached if the argument had been the other way around, although in
some of the cases the statements of the courts are strong enough to indi-
cate that it would.65 Again the results are not uniform, and in an Ohio
her domicile contravenes any of the ordinances of the town applicable to
permanent residences except that, instead of being built on the site by car-
penters and masons, it was prefabricated elsewhere and brought to its present
location on wheels. . . . [It was placed on a permanent foundation (insofar as
anything is permanent in this changing life) upon appellant's own premises. It
is as much a residence as though it were an ordinary house which had been
moved (as houses sometimes are) and brought to its resting place on wheels or
rollers. If such a structure is subject to taxation as an ordinary residence,
located for an indefinite time where it is situated, there is no constitutional
power in the town to prohibit it, if it conforms to other requirements of statute
and ordinance, merely for the reason that it was prefabricated and brought there
on wheels instead of being constructed on the site. The arbitrariness of the
ordinance is shown by section 61 (subd. i), which purports to forbid such a
structure except in trailer parks, even though it has been fashioned into a build-
ing as a component part.
Id. at 1001-02, 224 N.E2d at 736, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 233-34.
63 A. CASNER & W. LEAcH, CAsEs AND TExT ON PROPERTY 618 n.l (2d ed. 1969).
64 Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga. App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951); County of Will v:
Stanfill, 7 Ill. App. 2d 52, 129 N.E.2d 46 (1955); Town of Huntington v. Transon, 43
Misc. 2d 912, 252 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Corning v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38,
121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Lower Merion Township v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572,
46 A.2d 35 (1946).
65 A house trailer is simply a mobile house. It is as much a dwelling as any
house which is built on a foundation and therefore not mobile...
To say that these were not dwelling houses is an attempt to fictionalize a
reality. They were used and intended to be used as homes, and were as much
dwellings as any similarly sized structures could be. In fact they contained house-.
hold conveniences rarely present in houses so small. They differed from the
ordinary house only in respect to the ease with which they could be moved.
Lower Merion Township v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 575, 46 A.2d 35, 36 (1946) (em-
phasis by the court).
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case it was held that the structure was not a "building," a conclusion
which led the court to interpret the Ohio enabling statute as preventing
the county from regulating such modes of living.66 Whether one agrees
with the reasoning of the court as to the applicability of the particular
legislation, the precedential value of such an opinion is minimal be-
cause it clearly indicates that a change in the enabling statute would
have produced a different result.
Four cases, in varying degrees, lend strong support to the conten-
tion that the modem trend of authority is away from a semantical game
of skill and is concerned with more fundamental questions. These cases
either hold or imply that the question is not one of the use of appro-
priate language in the ordinance, but a more fundamental one of the
limit of the municipal power to make unreasonable distinctions be-
tween various modes of construction and living.
67
In re Willey68 is unusual in that it was an action by neighbors
challenging the validity of the issuance of a permit by the city of
Montpelier to Willey to erect a mobile home on a permanent founda-
tion on his lot. The city determined that a mobile home on a founda-
tion was a single-family house within the meaning of its zoning
ordinance.69 The county court overruled the city board of adjustment
and was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court of Vermont. In the
discussion, the court recognized the real issues involved and distin-
guished between the business of running a trailer park and the use of
a mobile home as a residence.70 It also pointed out that these matters
are questions of degree, not of kind, and that houses prefabricated and
brought to the site either whole or in sections do not thereby become
86 Brodnick v. Munger, 102 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
67 The Illinois Court of Appeals in County of Winnebago v. Hartman, 104 I1.
App. 2d 119, 242 N.E.2d 916 (1968), indicated its disagreement with its supreme court's
sanction of complete exclusion of mobile homes in Rezler v. Village of Riverside, 28 Ill.
2d 142, 190 N.E.d 706 (1963), by distinguishing that case on the flimsiest of grounds and
holding that mobile homes on permanent foundations were not "trailers" within the
meaning of the county zoning ordinance. See also Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will,
- Ill. App. 2d -, 252 N.E.2d 765 (1969).
68 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958). The far-reaching importance of Willey may be
gathered, inter alia, from the treatment it received by those who disagreed with the
result. Thus the Massachusetts court dismissed Willey with the comment "strict construc-
tion of ordinance adopted." Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 597, 180
N.E.2d 333, 337 (1962). Similarly, Carter avoided discussion of Willey by saying that
results similar to that in Commonwealth v. Flannery, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 680 (1954), were
reached in that case. Carter, supra note 6, at 36.
69 Here is another example of an interpretation of an ordinance by the body enact-
ing it.
70 120 Vt. at 363, 140 A.2d at 13.
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vehicles.7 . The impact of the opinion is somewhat weakened at the
end by a dictum to the effect that a specific provision in the ordinance
could have prohibited the erection of mobile homes on lots.72 However,
the point was not before the court and was not fully argued.
Willey was followed in Lescault v. Zoning Board of Cumberland.73
In that case, petitioner applied for a permit to use a trailer on a per-
manent foundation as a residence on a lot owned by him. The lot was
in an area zoned single-family attached dwellings. The building in-
spector granted the permit but was overruled by defendant board. The
court reviewed the ordinance and the facts and determined that the
immobilized trailer was clearly a single-family residence within the
meaning of the ordinance, making the action of the board an abuse
of discretion.74
These cases, while containing excellent discussions and outlining
very strong policy considerations, still rely primarily on the general
definition of "single-family residence" in the ordinances. A further
step away from semantics was taken inDouglass Township v. Badman.75
The ordinance involved in that case prohibited all mobile homes, de-
fined as "any portable structure or vehicle, titled or registered as a
vehicle, so constructed and designed as to permit occupancy thereof
for dwelling or sleeping purposes,' 76 from being located anywhere in
the township except in mobile home parks and prohibited the removal
of wheels from such structures. After the effective date of the ordinance
defendant moved a mobile home onto his lot in the township, removed
the wheels, and placed the home on a permanent foundation. The town-
ship brought criminal proceedings against him for violation of the
ordinance. The superior court reversed a conviction and directed dis-
missal of the charges.
Defendant argued that his home was not a "mobile home" as
defined in the ordinance and that, in any event, the ordinance was un-
constitutional. The court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality
of the ordinance. It held that a structure from which the wheels had
been removed and which had been placed on a permanent foundation
71 Id. at 364, 140 A.2d at 14.
72 "It is true that the legislative body of the City of Montpelier could have spe-
cifi6ally barred the use of a trailer coach as a home in the residential zone of that dty
when the ordinance was enacted." Id. at 865, 140 A.2d at 15.
78 91 RI. 277, 162 A.2d 807 (1960).
74 Id. at 281-82, 162 A.2d at 810.
75 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88 (1965). See also Anstine v. Zoning Rd. of Adjust-
ment of York Township, 411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1963).
76 206 Pa. Super. at 398, 213 A.2d at 89.
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is not a mobile home and therefore the provisions of the ordinance were
not violated. While the court rested its decision on the narrowest pos-
sible ground, the implications of the opinion go further. It is highly
questionable whether the court, if it had to face the issue, would really
rest its determination on the presence or absence of wheels. Further-
more, since the ordinance prohibited the location of mobile homes
outside of a park, it could be strongly argued that if the matter were
purely semantic, there was a violation of the ordinance in locating the
structure on defendant's lot. If the touchstone were simply the presence
or absence of wheels, then while the mobile home was being towed onto
the property and "located" there the law was being violated. Therefore,
it must be presumed that the court would go further in another case
and declare that a movable structure which otherwise complies with
the zoning and building code can be erected or brought onto a lot
zoned "single-family residences" and that the style of architecture or
design is a matter of personal taste.
This line of reasoning is strengthened by the most recent case in
point, State v. Work, 77 decided by the Supreme Court of Washington.
This was a criminal prosecution for a violation of a zoning resolution
of King County. Defendant had a mobile home eight feet by forty-six
feet moved onto a lot owned by her. The tongue, axles, and wheels were
removed and the body was put on a permanent concrete block founda-
tion. The structure was connected to water, electricity, and a septic
tank, all of which complied with the applicable county resolutions.
The lot on which the structure was moved was located in a single-family
district, and the zoning resolution defined a "building" as "any structure
having a roof but excluding all forms of vehicles even though immobi-
lized."78 Defendant raised the twin defenses of unconstitutionality and
of compliance with the resolution. Again the court decided the case
on the narrower ground and reversed the conviction of the trial court,
relying primarily on Willey.
This case goes further than the prior ones because, presumably
learning from prior opinions, the county included the concept of an
immobilized vehicle in its definition. While the case ostensibly turns
on the definition of the term "vehicle," it is doubtful that the court
engaged in verbal games and would have sustained the conviction if
the county had used the phrase "immobilized mobile home." Consider
the following language of the court:
77 75 Wash. 2d 212, 449 P.2d 806 (1969). For an example of a contrary attitude see
State v. Huffman, 20 Ohio App. 2d 263, 253 N.E.2d 812 (1969).
78 75 Wash. 2d at 14, 449 P.2d at 808.
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Whatever features of mobility the home had originally, the
mobility was of the home itself. It was not a vehicle, and it did
not become a proscribed, immobilized vehicle when its mobile
characteristics were removed and it was placed upon a foundation.
It was a prefabricated 1-family-dwelling unit which was not pro-
hibited upon the land in question.
7 9
The court makes it plain that it was concerned not with felicity in the
use of verbal formulae but with the characteristics of the structure in-
volved. If it had more of the characteristics of a residence, the matter
of design was to be decided by the individual taste of the owner, subject
to appropriate health and safety regulations.
The reasoning of the court is strengthened when one notices that
it pointed out that the ordinance would have clearly prohibited a dis-
carded school bus from being placed on the lot and converted into
living quarters.8 0 Thus the court has stated, in effect, that in later cases
it will look not at words but at the principal features of the structure
involved. If the structure is a makeshift shanty that does not comply
with health and safety regulations passed under the police power, it
will be prohibited. On the other hand, if it is a structure qualifying
under the applicable health and safety codes but constructed in a new
or unorthodox way, it will be permitted and the question of colors,
style, elevation, and materials used will be left to the discretion of the
property owner.
Viewing the trend of the more recent decisions we believe that
authority is definitely turning away from verbal skills and from attempts
at ingenious definitions to the more appropriate consideration of the
essential nature of the structure. If the structure is essentially a house,
although not conventionally built, and the primary difference is the
relative ease of removal, it is a home and should be permitted under
the applicable zoning ordinance. 8'
79 Id. at 215, 449 P.2d at 808-09. See also Algoma Township v. Van Lieu, 16 Mich.
App. 64, 168 N.W.2d 417 (1969).
80 "The zoning ordinance clearly prohibits a discarded school bus being turned into
living quarters and immobilized, but it does not prohibit defendant's dwelling unit upon
the land owned by her." 75 Wash. 2d at 215, 449 P.2d at 809.
81 The view that the issue is not primarily one of semantics is not shared by all.
Upon the publication of the opinion in State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 212, 449 P.2d 806
(1969), the Association of Washington Cities sent to its member cities a release, dated
March 17, 1969, entitled "Exclusion of Mobile Homes from Residential Areas," wherein
the following definition of the term "vehicle" in zoning ordinances was suggested:
The term "vehicie" as used herein shall mean all instrumentalities capable of
movement by means of circular wheels, skids or runners of any kind, along
roadways or paths or other ways of any kind, specifically including, but not
limited to, all forms of automotive vehicles, buses, trucks, cars and vans, all
forms of trailers or mobile homes of any size whether capable of supplying their
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B. The Mobile Home Park-A Business or a Horizontal Apartment
House?
While the problem of the mobile home on a lot is important, and
with the increased use of modular construction will become even more
urgent, it represents only a small segment of mobile home litigation
and mobile home use. It is still true that most mobile homes are located
in mobile home parks.82 We deal again with matters of degree. A dis-
tinction should be made at the outset between a trailer camp designed
for temporary or vacation use and a mobile home park designed for
year-round living. 83 While in borderline cases it may be difficult to
determine where one ends and the other begins, in the vast majority of
cases the distinction is clear. The issues involved and the public policy
considerations applicable are not identical, and generally the two kinds
of parks will not be found in the same locations. This article is con-
cerned only with mobile home parks designed for year-round living by
individuals or families.
Either by choice or by necessity, the great majority of mobile home
dwellers reside in mobile home parks. The reasons for this are many,
but when one considers the increasing preemption of mobile home
living by newlyweds and retired senior citizens, the importance of
economic factors is clear. When they have invested in a mobile home,
these people usually cannot afford land to put it on. Furthermore, in
the case of those retired, the desire to avoid the work involved in main-
own motive power or not, without regard to whether the primary purpose of
which instrumentality is or is not the conveyance of persons or objects, and
specifically including all such automobiles, buses, trucks, cars, vans, trailers and
mobile homes even though they may be at any time immobilized in any way and
for any period of time of whatever duration.
The definition does not seem to be a great improvement on the one construed by the
court in Work. However, if applied literally, it might exclude not only modular con-
struction, but also conventionally constructed houses moved from one site to another.
In marked contrast to the games the Association of Washington Cities proposes to
play with the term "vehicle," the zoning ordinance of the town of Monroe, N.Y., expressly
includes mobile homes in its definition of "dwelling," but provides for a minimum floor
area of 900 square feet and a minimum lot of 25,000 square feet. Osetek v. Barone, -
Misc. 2d -, -, 804 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
King County has, since the decision in Work, proposed a new ordinance regulating
the location of mobile homes on private property. As of September 19, 1969, no public
hearing on the proposed ordinance had been held.
82 A recent study indicates that approximately 75% of mobile homes in use through-
out the country are located in mobile home parks. MAcomB SuDy 6. See also Mayer, supra
note 27, at 145.
83 The distinction is carefully pointed out in Ring, The Mobile Home, 25 URBAN
LAND, July-Aug. 1966, at 1. For a recent case discussing the problems of parks for
temporary use, see Baxter v. Gillespie, 60 Misc. 2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
[Vol. 55:491
MOBILE HOMES
tamining a residential lot may be important.8 4 Others may locate in a
park rather than buy land because they anticipate having to move
within a relatively short period. Again, if mobile homes or modular
construction are to play a role in a partial solution of the housing
problem for lower-income families, economic factors suggest that mobile
home parks will be involved. For all of these reasons, zoning, as it affects
mobile home living, is primarily a question of mobile home parks.8 5
In considering zoning regulations and policies with respect to
mobile home parks, two distinct groups and interests are involved. As
concerns property owners who want to develop their land for mobile
home parks, our attention focuses primarily on due process, namely the
permissible limits of municipal action limiting their right to use their
property in any lawful way they see fit. This is the traditional manner
of viewing zoning disputes-the immediate community interest versus
the individual landowner.86 However, it has been suggested that courts
should take notice of another group that has so far been ignored: out-
siders who want to move in and are excluded by zoning policies. As
to this group, the argument goes, courts should pay attention to the
new or expanded concept of equal protection of the law. 7 In the
context of this discussion the group will consist primarily of the racially
or economically disadvantaged who might be effectively precluded from
seeking improved or different housing opportunities by the unavail-
ability of mobile home parks within their means and having easy access
to job opportunities.
As indicated above, local hostility to mobile homes and mobile
home living has taken on various guises, 88 ranging from total prohibi-
84 BARTLEY & BAIR 11; HODES & ROBERSON 6; MACOMB STUDY 4-6.
85 HODES & ROBEasON 91; BABcocK, supra note 30, at 95.
86 The difficulty with the due process approach should be obvious: It is an
equation formulated to express and resolve the tension between the interests of
the planning polity and the individual land owner ....
There is a second aspect of the traditional due process approach in zoning
matters that is inappropriate to the problem of exclusionary zoning, namely, the
question of whether the municipality has acted in a manner calculated to ad-
vance public welfare.... An acknowledgement of the sound basis of a zoning
ordinance, followed by an offset of the importance of free residential access,
would combine the virtues of judicial candor and decisional nuance.
Sager, supra note 1, at 784-85.
87 Id. at 785-98.
88 For a collection of representative cases see notes 32 and 33 supra; see Carter, supra
note 6, at 24-28; Note, Trailer Parks vs. the Municipal Police Power, 34 CONN. 3B.J. 285
(1960); 61 MicH. L. REV. 1010 (1963); 17 Ruraas L. REv. 659 (1963); cf. Village of Roxana
v. Costanzo, 41 IMI. 2d 423, 243 N.E.2d 242 (1968).
The same courts have treated problems essentially similar to those raised by trailer
parks differently. For example, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in two cases,
Karen v. Town of East Haddam, 146 Conn. 720, 155 A.2d 921 (1959), and Town of Heart-
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tion to onerous provisions-particularly those putting a time limitation
on the stay of any one family unit in the park-which effectively elim-
inate mobile home living in many areas.89 Where mobile home living is
theoretically permitted, it is often regarded as a business and relegated
to commercial or even industrial zones, making it extremely unattrac-
tive as an alternative residential option.90
As courts and legislatures eliminate some of the discriminatory
practices against mobile home living, local government units become
more sophisticated in devising new subterfuges. Thus a municipality
may provide a token amount of land for mobile home parks, with a pro-
vision for allocating more land in the future for such purposes, depend-
ing on development. Later, when development has taken place and the
area has been used for single-family residences, development is used as a
justification for not allocating any more land for mobile homes. 91
land v. Jensen's, Inc., 146 Conn. 697, 155 A.2d 754 (1959), upheld the validity of municipal
ordinances limiting the duration of the stay in a mobile home park in the community
on the ground that an influx of a trailer population could put an intolerable burden
upon the town's available municipal services, particularly its schools. Yet the same court,
in Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Milford, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954),
compelled the town to approve a residential plan despite a plea that the rapid suburban
development was outrunning all municipal services, including schools.
There seems to be a general rethinking of the proper function of zoning and a new
realization that zoning should not be used as a means of shifting the economic burdens
of community services on single individuals or entities. See, e.g., Westwood Forest Estates,
Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 287 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1969).
The same kind of approach should be applied to mobile homes.
89 Thus the recent study by the planning commission of Macomb County, which lies
just north of the Detroit city limits, indicates that many mobile home parks located there
as a result of Detroit's 90-day limitation on the stay in mobile home parks. This limita-
tion was upheld in Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939), appeal dismissed,
309 U.S. 620 (1940). MACOMB STUDY 10.
90 "Some communities feel, or have felt in the past, that the best locations for mobile
homes are next to railroads or within industrial or commercial areas." MACOMB STUDY 11.
The Macomb Study recommends that "community officials . . . locate mobile home parks
on sites conducive to residential use and not relegate their location to sites within in-
dustrial districts, along railroad tracks or other undesirable areas." Id. at 12; ef. Edwards
v. Township of Montrose, 18 Mich. App. 569, 171 N.W.2d 555 (1969) (unreasonable to pro-
hibit mobile home park in an undeveloped area that was bounded on one side by a
commercial gravel pit and on the other, across a river, by a sewage treatment facility).
See also BARTLEY & BArn 75-80; HODES & ROBERSON 10; Ring, supra note 83, at 4. A recent
article, purporting to describe the experience of one family in mobile home living, con-
dudes with the following: "We had learned that the biggest problem you can have
with a mobile home is where to immobilize it." What Living in a Mobile Home is Like,
23 CHANGING TiMEs, Oct. 1969, at 11.
91 This technique is illustrated by the recent Michigan case of Rottman v. Town-
ship of Waterford, 13 Mich. App. 271, 274, 164 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1968):
[Plaintiffs further contend that this vice in the ordinance [absence of any vacant
land presently zoned for mobile home parks] is not overcome by provisions for
rezoning so that land presently zoned for other purposes might be zoned in the
future for trailer park use.
The court did not bother to discuss this argument.
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The basic and almost insoluble problem is that zoning is done at
the local level.92 All of our metropolitan centers experience a prolifera-
tion of small municipal corporations, each with its own zoning powers.
No overall plan for the development of the area can be prepared. The
smaller the municipality involved, the more plausible the argument
that it cannot and should not be required to provide for all possible
uses. At the end of the scale we find the single-use municipality, which
depends for all of its support and service areas on neighboring com-
munities. When a number of single-use municipalities constitute a
whole region, the result may be that no provision has been made
for some given use within an extensive geographical territory. This in
turn effectively precludes certain classes of people from ever seeking
opportunities to live or work in major segments of the metropolis. It
is notorious that certain of the smallest municipal corporations were
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring zoning powers and thereby
preserving what the inhabitants consider to be a desirable neighbor-
hood.93 That the problems here outlined are not theoretical is illus-
trated by the fact that in New Jersey, whose courts have sanctioned
complete exclusion of mobile home parks from municipalities,94 two-
A variation of this technique consists of no area being specifically zoned for mobile
home parks and then the parks are authorized only by special permit. See Scherrer v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 201 Kan. 424, 441 P.2d 901 (1968), where the court held a
denial of a permit to be unreasonable.
92 BACOCK, supra note 30, at 19-20; Aloi, Goldberg & White, supra note 1, at 72-74;
Sager, supra note 1, at 793.
93 One of the authors knows a suburban community of some 450 people, located on
a small peninsula jutting into a lake, which has one road running the length of the
peninsula giving access to the homes. It incorporated for the sole purpose of passing a
zoning ordinance providing for a minimum lot size of four acres. For further examples,
see BABcocK, supra note 30, at 20-23.
94 The seal of approval was given in Vickers v. Township of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232,
181 A.2d 129 (1962). The opinion was not unanimous, and the dissenting opinion of-
Justice Hall addressed itself admirably to the fundamental issues involved:
In my opinion legitimate use of the zoning power by such municipalities
does not encompass the right to erect barricades on their boundaries through ex-
clusion or too tight restriction of uses where the real purpose is to prevent feared
disruption with a so-called chosen way of life. Nor does it encompass provisions
designed to let in as new residents only certain kinds of people, or those who
can afford to live in favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of present
property owners. When one of the above is the true situation deeper considera-
tions intrinsic in a free society gain the ascendency and courts must not be
hesitant to strike down purely selfish and undemocratic enactments. I am not
suggesting that every such municipality must endure a plague of locusts or
suffer transition to a metropolis over night. I suggest only that regulation
rather than prohibition is the appropriate technique for attaining a balanced
and attractive community ....
Id. at 264-65, 181 A.2d at 147. See also the discussion of mobile home living, id. at 266-67,
181 A.2d at 148.
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thirds of its nearly 600 municipalities prohibit mobile home parks
altogether.95
We do not advocate the unregulated proliferation of mobile home
parks. Such parks present problems of their own. By the very nature of
the development, a much more intensive use of land is involved than
is the case in most single-family residential'districts.96 Additional prob-
lems of waste disposal, municipal services, congestion, and traffic are
present. And unless appropriate standards are developed, mobile home
parks can easily become eyesores.97 But in this respect they are no dif-
ferent from many other "cracker box" developments that have been
thrown up in semi-rural areas, particularly in the 1950's.98 Good plan-
ning demands appropriate requirements as to traffic pattern integration,
beautification schemes (including possible screening with trees and
shrubs), density requirements, and similar provisions, so long as they
are not discriminatory.99 It should always be borne in mind that any
kind of regulation may become a means of exclusion. 1°0 Requirement
may be piled on requirement to a point where the whole development
becomes economically unfeasible, or at least unsuitable for those of
modest means. As in most other areas, society must strike a balance.
95 Ring, supra note 83, at 4.
96 A very interesting comparison of intensity of use is found in the study of the
Macomb County Planning Commission. For the county as a whole the average density for
mobile home parks is 12.1 units per gross acre, the range being from 5.1 units to 55.4
units. What is more important is that parks constructed after 1960 and designed for the
larger, modem units have ten or fewer units per gross acre. This compares with four to
six single-family residences per gross acre and 14 to 20 apartments per gross acre for the
county as a whole. MACOMB STUDY 12. For a discussion of the relevance of density in
regulating mobile home park development, see Hedrich v. Kane County, - Ill. App. 2d
-, 253 N.E2d 566 (1969).
97 There is at present a private, national rating system for mobile home parks,
known as the Woodall System, which awards from one to five stars. In connection with
the authorization of FHA-insured mortgages for mobile home parks (12 U.S.C. §§ 1713(a)
(1)(B), (6) (1964)), the Federal Housing Administration has developed a set of uniform
criteria for their development. FEDERAL HoUsING ADMINISTRATION, MINIMUM PROPERTY
STANDARDS FOR MOBILE HOME COURTS (1967).
98 There is considerable force in Babcock's argument that good planning should
provide for future absorption, at a minimum social and economic cost, of obsolete tech-
niques. He says: "In 1980 it will be more costly to eradicate the blighted tract subdivision
built in 1950 than it will be to redevelop the land now occupied by everyone's pariah,
the trailer park." BABcoCK, supra note 30, at 136-37.
99 See, e.g., BARTLEY & BAIR 80-94.
100 Aloi, Goldberg & White, supra note 1, at 76-79; Sager, supra note 1, at 790-98.
Justice Hall indicates in his dissent in Vickers v. Township of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232,
265 n.4, 181 A.2d 129, 147 n.4 (1962), that in oral argument counsel for the township
stated that people who live in trailers are a shifting population and do not make good
citizens.
It should also be borne in mind that exclusionary policies may, in the long run,
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A particular problem arises with low-income families. If mobile
home living is to be used to alleviate housing problems of the poor
and make it possible for them to move close to available jobs, extensive
public expenditures will be necessary. Just as slums do not cause but
are a product of poverty, and as setting building and occupancy require-
ments too high has an effect opposite from that desired,101 the setting
of too high requirements for mobile home parks, without public
subsidies, will either exclude low-income families or result in eva-
sions. In order to make mobile home parks for low-income families
acceptable in new locations and not disrupt the neighborhoods by the
creation of slums, it will be necessary. to set high standards. But poor
people, at least initially, will be unable to pay in full for the use of
such parks and part of the cost will have to be underwritten, one way
or another, by the public treasury at whatever level of government
may be deemed best suited for the purpose.102
For too long the problem of mobile home parks has been regarded
primarily as one of local concern, to be regulated in the first instance
by local authority, which is to say by local prejudice.10 Experience has
produce unforeseen and undesirable side effects. A recent newspaper survey in Wayne
County, Michigan (where Detroit is located), indicates that the severe shortage of space
in mobile home parks, created in part by exclusionary practices, has resulted in de-
terioration of standards in some parks because of the absence of competitive pressures.
The Detroit News, Aug. 26, 1969, at 1-D, col. 1.
101 J. HEILBRUN, REAL ESTATE TAXES AND URBAN HOUSING 58 (1966); Davis & Whin-
ston, The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 105, 112 (1961); Stern-
lieb, Slum Housing: A Functional Analysis, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 349 (1967);
Comment, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAIw. L. REv. 801 (1965).
102 For an estimate of the financial resources necessary, see 2 Par.SwrNT's CoTsr.
ON URBAN HOUSING, REPORT: A DECENT HOME 48-50 (1968).
103 Those states that have legislation with respect to the regulation of mobile
home parks fall generally into three categories:
(a) Statutes with detailed requirements: ALAsKA STAT. § 18.35.030 (1962); CAL. HEALTH
AND SAfETY CODE § 18250 (West Supp. 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111Y, §§ 158-85 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-2841 to -2881 (1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.278
(31)-.278(127) (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.20 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-10-07
(1960y; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 446.002-.165 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3201 to -3216 (1955).
(b) Statutes that give the general power to confer licenses and adopt regulations to
the appropriate state agency: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-110 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
122(H) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 513.05 (1962); IoWA CODE § 135D,16 (Supp. 1969); KY. REv.
STAT. § 219.160 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2481 (1964); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 41 A:8270(d) (Supp. 1968): MONT. RFv. CODE ANN. § 69-113 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-1-13 (1953); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.02 (Page Supp. 1968); RI. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 23-21-4 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-8 (Supp. 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-15-4 (1953).
(c) Statutes that give general authority to regulate mobile home parks to the local
governing agency: CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-148 (Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1103
(1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-3701 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 22 (1957); MAss. ANN.
LAWs ch. 140, § 32B (Supp. 1965); NEE. REv. STAT. § 60-1601 (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
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shown that local governments are unable or unwilling to meet their
responsibilities in this regard. It will become necessary to have uniform
state-wide legislative standards, which would at least limit local discre-
tion in this respect. Furthermore, more attention should be paid to the
possibilities of the use of mobile homes in the fight against urban
blight and inadequate housing. A careful reappraisal by all concerned
is long overdue.
III
THE MOBILE HOME AND PRIVATE ZONING
Private zoning,104 known colloquially as covenants, conditions, and
restrictions, whatever the legal label used by the courts, 0 5 performs
essentially the same function as public zoning. In newly developing
areas, it may constitute the only kind of enforceable and uniform
regulation if it precedes public zoning. 0 6 Even in areas where public
zoning exists or is about to be introduced, private zoning may be use-
ful as a supplement. 0 7 Under these circumstances, however, there is a
possibility of conflict between private and public zoning, and in recent
§ 47:22a (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:52-1(d) (1967); N.Y. TowN LAW §§ 130(21),
136(11) (McKinney 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2231 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 35-62
(1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.058 (1965).
Of course, this is but one small aspect of the fragmentization of our metropolitan
centers. For a short discussion of the overall problem, see Grant, Metropolitan Problems
and Local Government Structure: An Examination of Old and New Issues, 22 VAND.
L. REv. 757-60 (1969).
104 The term is increasingly used to denote private restrictions on use. See, e.g.,
Beuscher, Private Zoning on Milwaukee's Metropolitan Fringe-A Preface, 1958 Wis. L.
REv. 610.
105 The courts variously refer to these arrangements as covenants real, negative re-
ciprocal easements, or equitable servitudes, although it is generally agreed that most of
such restrictions in this country depend on the equitable device developed in Tulk v.
Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). For further discussion see C. CLARK, REAL
COVENANIS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" (2d ed. 1947); McCarthy,
Restrictive Covenants, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 709; Paulus, The Use of Equitable Servitudes in
Land Planning, 2 WiLLAM~rrE L.J. 399 (1963).
106 Consigny & Zile, Use of Restrictive Covenants in a Rapidly Urbanizing Area, 1958
WIs. L. Rv. 612, 612-14; Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv.
389, 448-53; Paulus, supra note 105.
107 And even if the area is zoned, the private agreement has certain advantages
over public control via zoning. It can be used to provide for more restrictive uses
than required by the zoning ordinance .... In addition the private agreement
has the advantage of providing much more stable protection to the property
owners because it is not as easily changed as a zoning ordinance.




years these problems have frequently come before the courts.,08 There
is no generally recognized method of resolving these conflicts and the
law is very much in a state of flux.
Although public and private zoning are functional equivalents,
the legal bases for their enforcement are very different. Public zoning
is a function of the police power and is subject to all the requirements
and constitutional limitations flowing therefrom. On the other hand,
private zoning is regarded as contractual in nature and therefore is
generally not subject to many of the limitations and restrictions said
to be imposed on public enactments.10 9 As a result, courts have taken
distinctly different approaches to the enforceability of private and pub-
lic regulation. This difference in approach has recently come under
scrutiny and criticism.110 Part of the criticism is directed towards the
same abuse of private zoning that has at times characterized public
zoning: the disguised or not so disguised attempt to exclude racial
or economic groups from given communities.
Mobile homes and restrictive covenants have come into col-
lision. The number of reported cases is small"" and up to now the
problem has presumably been a minor one, greatly overshadowed
by the problem created by public zoning, particularly as it affects mobile
home parks. However, with the decreasing mobility of mobile homes
and with the trend toward prefabricated modular construction, such
collisions are likely to occur much more frequently.
The reported cases fall under two distinct categories.112 The first
concerns the proposed establishment of mobile home parks in an area
restricted to residences or single-family residences. These cases are
easily disposed of. The other and more difficult group concerns attempts
by owners of restricted lots to place mobile homes thereon. Although,
at first blush, it could be suspected that since covenants are contractual
in nature, the distinctions would be almost entirely a matter of seman-
tics and would depend on the care with which the restrictive covenants
had been drafted, the few available cases do not bear this out. Essentially,
108 Some of these problems are discussed in Berger, Conflicts Between Zoning Ordi-
nances and Restrictive Covenants: A Problem in Land Use Policy, 43 NEB. L. REv. 449
(1964). This concern is not shared by all. For the view that no conflict, actual or potential,
exists, see 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 686, at 230A-.6 (recomp. by P. Rohan 1968).
109 For a discussion of the difference in approach, see Comment, supra note 51.
110 Id. at 419-37.
II We have been able to find only nine cases in point. For earlier cases dealing with
"tourist homes" or "tourist camps" as violating restrictive covenants, for whatever light
they may shed on the problem, see Annot., 127 A.L.R. 849 (1940).
112 The cases are almost equally divided, with four dealing with the first problem
and five with the second.
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the courts treat the matter in the same way as they treat public zoning
and decide the cases on the same grounds, whether upholding the
validity of the use or condemning it as in derogation of the covenant.
Public zoning cases are frequently used as authority, whether they
uphold the use or condemn it. At least one court seems to have been
much more liberal in the private zoning area than it was in the public
sector."18
There seem to be only four reported cases dealing with proposed
use of restricted land for mobile home parks.114 Not surprisingly, the
courts ruled in all of them that such use would violate the covenant
as construed. This seems entirely proper, once it has been decided that
the land in question is restricted to single-family living. Under such
circumstances, a mobile home park does not qualify whether it is con-
sidered as a business or as a horizontal apartment house. But at least
one court found it necessary to imply that the proposed use would
violate one of the covenants against a "noxious or offensive trade or
business.""lr5 This language should be taken with a grain of salt, since
the person of the defendant, who was proposing to establish the camp,
apparently had much to do with the result."'6
In two of the cases, the main problem faced by the courts was
whether the covenants applied to particular land and what their mean-
ing was."17 Some of the courts' reasoning may seem questionable, but
once one has accepted the conclusion the result follows logically. In
the most recent case, the court went out of its way to state in a very
strong dictum, twice repeated, that the erection of a mobile home for
family purposes on the land in a more or less permanent fashion would
not have violated a covenant restricting the land to "farming and
dwelling purposes."118 Thus, it is safe to say that so long as the covenants
313 Compare Naiman v. Bilodeau, 225 A.2d 758 (Me. 1967), with Wright v. Michaud,
160 Me. 164, 200 A2d 543 (1964).
114 Hallet v. Sumpter, 106 F. Supp. 996 (D. Alas. 1952); Reetz v. Ellis, 279 Ala. 453,
186 So. 2d 915 (1966); Grange v. Korff, 248 Iowa 118, 79 N.W.2d 743 (1956); Foos v. Engle,
295 Ky. 114, 174 S.W.2d 5 (1943).
115 "It is not necessary to find that the operation of a trailer court in this resi-
dential area is a 'noxious or offensive trade or business' although under the circum-
stances it may well be classified as such . Hallet v. Sumpter, 106 F. Supp. 996, 999
(D. Alas. 1952).
116 The opinion indicates that defendant was moving from his prior location, which
was to be incorporated into the City of Anchorage, to avoid police regulation. Id. at 998.
117 Hallet v. Sumpter, 106 F. Supp. 996 (D. Alas. 1952); Grange v. Korff, 248 Iowa
118, 79 N.W.2d 743 (1956).
118 "If such a trailer be placed on a lot of land and be there occupied by one or more
persons as a place of abode, we think such use of the land would be a use for dwelling
purposes." Reetz v. Ellis, 279 Ala. 453, 457, 186 So. 2d 915, 918 (1966).
Respondents cite Schaeffer v. Gatling . . . . The Supreme Court of Miss-
issippi held that such use of the lot did not violate the restriction which required
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are reasonably explicit in restricting the land to single-family residences,
any attempt to use it for mobile home parks is invalid. We suggest
only that in such cases the courts, rather than go out of their way to
talk about mobile home parks as businesses, simply state that the
restrictions preclude multiple family dwellings and that a horizontal
apartment house does not comply with the provisions.
Concerning the use of the mobile home as one's residence on
restricted land, the courts have disagreed. In each case one must look
very carefully at the language of the restrictive covenant to determine
whether the proposed use does or does not violate it. Nevertheless, there
is a very obvious difference in emphasis between the two lines of cases,
a difference not always justified by the difference in language. There is
also, with one exception, a definite correlation with the attitude of
the courts in dealing with mobile homes as affected by public zoning.119
The first case in which a mobile home was held to violate a
covenant was decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado. The covenant
provided that the land "will be used for dwelling houses only.' 120 The
trial judge construed this to mean that the land was to be used ex-
clusively for the construction of new, permanent houses, that a trailer
was a contraption to be used for hauling behind an automobile or
truck, and that a trailer belonged in a trailer court.121 This reasoning
was approved on appeal.
In the next case, the Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with a
restriction which provided that "[a]ll buildings erected upon the real
estate.., shall be of a permanent character and be upon foundations
and shall not be less than 14 feet by 18 feet in size. No garage, trailer,
shack or hut shall be used for living purposes."'122 The defendant
brought his mobile home onto his lot. He removed the wheels, placed
the home on cement blocks, and surrounded it by siding. He connected
it to water, electricity, and a septic tank. Despite the immobilization
of the structure and its floor area in excess of the minimum required
by the covenant, the court held that it was a "trailer" within the mean-
ing of the restriction and therefore prohibited.12  Finally, an Ohio
lower court, following the marked aversion to mobile homes displayed
by the supreme court of that state, held that a covenant providing that
that the property be used strictly for residential purposes. We are not disposed
to disagree. . . .We do not think the Mississippi case is in conflict with our
holding in the ,instant case.
Id. at 459-60, 186 So. 2d at 920.
119 The exception, of course, is Maine. See cases cited in note 113 supra.
120 Pagel v. Gisi, 132 Colo. 181, 182, 286 P.2d 636, 637 (1955).
121 Id. at 185-86, 286 P.2d at 638.
122 Jones v. Beiber, 251 Iowa 969, 971, 108 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1960).
123 Id. at 973, 103 N.W.2d at 366.
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"[n]o building shall be erected or maintained upon any lot except one
residence designed and used for occupation by a single family and not
more than one and one-half stories in height"'124 precluded mobile
homes. Although the court paid lip service to the proposition that rq-
strictive covenants should be strictly construed in favor of the free use
of one's property, it concluded that a trailer was a trailer and not a
residence within the meaning of the covenant. 125
In marked contrast to the above reasoning, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that the contemplated use was no violation. The
covenant restricted the land to residential purposes and provided that
"[n]o residences shall be erected . . . which shall cost less than
$6,000 .... "126 Defendants purchased a fifty-five foot mobile home,
which cost more than $6,000, and moved it to their lot where they
rested it on a foundation of concrete piers, although the wheels were
not removed. They connected the home to water, sewer, and electricity,
and placed it on the land so as to comply with set-back requirements.
The court indicated that if mobile homes were to be prohibited
specific language to that effect would have to be used.127 How specific
such language would have to be and at which point modular construc-
tion would no longer be a mobile home remains to be decided in future
litigation.
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that a mobile
home, forty-six feet by ten feet with a permanently attached 300 square-
foot living space, did not violate a restrictive covenant providing that the
land should be used for residential purposes only and that no dwelling
should be erected having less than 700 square feet of first-floor space,
with asphalt roof and clapboard siding or better.' 28 The court pointed
out that the aluminum siding and roof of the mobile home exceeded
the minimum quality requirements of the covenant, and that the com-
bined floor area of the mobile home and its addition exceeded the min-
imum floor area prescribed. In doing so, the court distinguished its prior
decision in Wright v. Michaud129 by stating that the issue there involved
124 Swigart v. Richards, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 37, 38, 178 N.E.2d 109, 110 (C.P. 1961).
125 Id. at 41-42, 178 N.E.2d at 111-12.
126 Schaeffer v. Gatling, 243 Miss. 155, 158, 137 So. 2d 819 (1962).
127 If the original owner of the subdivision had desired to prohibit the use of
house trailers as residences, this could easily have been accomplished by desig-
nating house trailers as prohibited use, or by restricting architectural design, or
by placing a minimum on the floor space for a residence, or by prohibiting
temporary residences.
Id. at 159, 137 So. 2d at 820.
128 Naiman v. Bilodeau, 225 A.2d 758 (Me. 1967).
129 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964). Plaintiff applied, for a variance to permit him
to "park" a mobile home in a residential and farming zone. He proposed to remove the
wheels, put the home on a permanent foundation, and connect it to utilities.
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was the municipal power to pass zoning ordinances. 130 The broader
issue of the limits of such power was completely ignored.131
As the above cases indicate, it should be possible in almost any
jurisdiction to preclude by appropriate draftsmanship the use of mobile
or modular construction homes in restricted subdivisions. Whether this
interpretation will continue in force with the forthcoming revolution
in building techniques remains to be seen. We suspect that when the
full impact of factory-produced housing becomes evident the courts
will have to change their attitudes. In the meantime, it would behoove
developers to be very careful how they limit the structures that may be
built in the subdivisions developed by them. If they use too restrictive
language, thereby precluding various kinds of prefabricated or partially
fabricated housing, they may find that their land is not marketable.
In a period of rapid and dynamic change in construction methods and
concepts, rigid rules as to the type of structure permitted may be detri-
mental both to developers and to purchasers in those subdivisions.
The day may come when courts will take a closer look at the
broader policy aspects of private zoning. The first dent was made in
Shelley v. Kraemer.3 2 The full implications of this decision have not
yet been settled, 33 but common sense dictates that a collision course
be avoided. This can be accomplished by wise draftsmanship and rea-
sonable judicial construction.
IV
THE MOBILE HOME AND TAXATION
Most of the money acquired by American municipalities to pro-
vide local services is derived from the property tax. 34 Because of this
130 225 A.2d at 760.
131 The Wright case seems to have been submitted on a short stipulation of facts
(160 Me. at 165.66, 200 A.2d at 544) and the issues do not seem to have been really de-
veloped. For a discussion of financial limitations which preclude adequate presentation
in many zoning cases, see BABCOCK, supra note 30, at 94-97.
132 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racially restrictive covenants, while not illegal, are unenforce-
able by injunction). See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (money damages may
not be collected for breach of racially restrictive covenants). See also Capital Fed. Say.
9- Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957) (a possibility of reverter based
on racial grounds may not be enforced). Contra, Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n
v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
133 For a collection of the more important articles in point, see Sager, supra note
1, at 777 n.55. See also an excellent article published since the Sager piece, Haskell, Con-
tractual Devices to Keep "Undesirables" Out of the Neighborhood, 54 CoRuemL L. REv.
524 (1969).
134 D. NErzER, ECONOMICS OF THE P.orFarY TAx 8-10 (1966); Reitze, Real Property
Tax Exemptions in Ohio-Fiscal Absurdity, 18 CASE W. RES. L. R v. 64 (1966).
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ever-present burden of taxation imposed on the homeowner,"1 5 any feel-
ing that certain groups enjoy the same services but do not contribute
their fair share of the tax revenue leads inevitably to hostility. This is
certainly true, in many parts of the country, with respect to mobile
home dwellers.""
However much we may depart from the ideal in practice, we
always profess in theory to strive towards the goal of horizontal equity
in taxation. 37 The ideal for any tax system is to treat equally those
similarly situated. Thus in the context of the income tax the ideal
would be to tax the same amount all those whose spendable incomes
are similar. 3 8 In the same way, the property tax should affect equally
all those who own similar kinds of property of the same value. 3 9 In
many states this principle is violated with respect to mobile homes.'
40
This is partly due to antiquated legislation, which has not kept up
with developments and which still treats mobile homes as vehicles,
partly to conceptual difficulties of how to characterize mobile homes
for tax purposes, and partly to the competition between state and
local units of government for revenue dollars. However, in recent years
a trend has become apparent in the direction of taxing mobile homes
as real estate, which should be the goal of all the states, so that mobile
home dwellers contribute their fair share to the support of the local
services that benefit them.
135 NarzR, supra note 134, at 45-66. Heilbrun refers to it as "the heavy, continuous,
and unyielding pressure of real estate taxes upon urban life." HEIBRUN, supra note 101,
at 173.
136 HODEs & ROBERSON 109-10; MACOMB STUDy 27-32; Berney & Larson, supra note
16. For a recent expression of such sentiments, see Monmouth Junction Mobile Home
Park, Inc. v. South Brunswick Township, 107 N.J. Super. 18, -, 256 A.2d 721, 725-26 (1969).
137 "One universally accepted goal for any taxing authority is to insure that horizon-
tal equity exists; that is, people in like circumstances should be taxed in a similar man-
ner," Berney & Larson, supra note 16, at 458. See also Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform
-Twenty Questions, 41 TAxEs 672, 679 (1963).
138 It is exceedingly difficult, of course, to reach the ideal, and there is a lively
controversy as to the very concept of income. See the stimulating controversy between
Professor Bittker and the proponents of the "comprehensive tax base." Bittker, A "Com-
prehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HAv. L. REv. 925 (1967);
Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HAsv. L. REv. 44 (1967); Pechman,
Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REv. 63 (1967); Galvin, More
on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform
and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1016 (1968); Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxa-
tion: A Response, 81 HARv. L. Rv. 1032 (1968).
139 For a description of the distortions created by special exemptions, see Pacific Con-
ference of the Free Methodist Church v. Barlow, 77 Wash. 2d 492, 497-501, 463 P.2d 626,
629-31 (1969); Reitze, supra note 134.
140 See, e.g., Note, Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home
Taxation, 71 YALE L.J. 702 (1962).
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Before a discussion of the types of taxation employed and of the
recent developments, the question of the fair share has to be men-
tioned. Several studies, national and local, have indicated that earlier
fears of an invasion by a nomadic, footloose population with many
children have not proved true.141 In fact, because of the type of people
this mode of living attracts, mobile home dwellers may require fewer
services than the population at large.142 This seems particularly true
of schools, which are heavily supported by local property taxation.143
Therefore, studies might show that mobile home dwellers may be
contributing more to public schools per household than owners of
conventional houses, which may lead to a conclusion that they pay
their fair share of taxes. However, such an approach is fraught with
dangerous implications.
This line of reasoning follows the benefits received approach. 44
Pushed to its logical extreme, it would displace the concept of taxation
according to ability to pay 45 and shift most of the tax burden to the
poor. Therefore, however interesting the studies may be and however
valuable in the short run to allay fears and hostilities of the community
against mobile home dwellers, they cannot be used as a long-range
policy guide. The ultimate objective should be to achieve a horizontal
equality by subjecting mobile home dwellers to the same kind of taxa-
tion as their neighbors living in more traditional forms of housing.
The inventiveness of the legislators in the fifty states has produced
a bewildering array of taxing schemes directed at mobile homes. 146
The devices can be grouped into four major categories. Mobile homes
are either taxed as a kind of motor vehicle, 147 taxed as personal prop-
141 E.g., HODES & ROBERSON 1-11; French & Hadden, supra note 14, at 131-39; Note,
supra note 140, at 702-05.
142 See, e.g., MAcOMB STUDY 30-32; Berney & Larson, supra note 16, at 458-62.
143 MACOMB STUDY 30-32; Berney & Larson, supra note 16, at 460.
144 It should be noted, however that any discussion of "fair share" follows
the "benefits received" approach to taxation; that is, those who receive govern-
ment services should pay for them in the same manner as is done in the pri-
vate market place.
Berney & Larson, supra note 16, at 460.
145 The concept of taxation measured by ability to pay was advocated by Adam
Smith, as follows: "The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support
of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities .... "
A. SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777 (The
Modern Library ed. 1937).
146 For earlier discussion of the various approaches, see Note, supra note 140, at 705-
11; Carter, supra note 6, at 46-57.
147 NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-1606 (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2101, 2103 (1966);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.50.020 (Supp. 1969).
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erty,14s subjected to a license fee system, 4 9 or taxed as realty. 50 The last
approach most nearly equalizes mobile homes and other forms of hous-
ing.'5 ' Arguably, taxing mobile homes as real estate where they have
not been so taxed in the past places an unfair burden on mobile home
dwellers: Taxes being a part of the cost of housing, the economy may
have equalized the costs of living in mobile homes and other forms of
housing under the present tax structure; changing the tax structure may
destroy the equality.152 In our opinion, however, this argument has been
refuted.1 3
For a number of years there was confusion and uncertainty as to
the validity of the taxation of mobile homes as real estate, particularly
homes located in mobile home parks. 1  The dichotomy discussed above
between mobile homes permanently placed on somebody's real estate
as an alternative form of dwelling and those parked in a mobile home
park recurs here. Where the owner or lessee of land brings a mobile
148 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-642 (Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-406 (1947);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 12-63a (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-622a (1961); IowA
CODE § 135D.22 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168-012(9) (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 137.090 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 84-6601 (Supp. vol. 4, 1969); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 361.563 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 44-3-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1436
(1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 10-9-2 (1967).
149 ALASKA STAT. § 35.1.74 (1962); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18202 (West Supp.
1970); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3-4(e) (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2301 (Supp.
1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.03 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-410 (Supp. 1969);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111/, § 169 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-2879 (1969);
IOWA CODE § 135D.5 (Supp. 1969); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 219.130 (1969); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, § 1753 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 140, § 32G (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5.278(21), (22) (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.16(3) (1966); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41 A:9696-
185 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 144-560 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1603 (1968);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:52-1 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-10-05 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3733.04 (Page Supp. 1968); ORE. REv. STAT. § 446-016 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
2232(4) 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 35-62 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66-058 (Supp. 1969).
150 ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 704(1) (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1930 (Supp.
1968); IOWA CODE § 135D.26 (Supp. 1969); NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 60-1601 (1968); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 72:7a (Supp. 1967); N.Y. RE.AL PROP. TAx LAw § 102(12)(g) (McKinney
1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-201 (1968).
151 See, e.g., Berney & Larson, supra note 16, at 461-62; Note, supra note 140, at
712-19.
152 Rooney, Micro-Analysis of Mobile Home Characteristics with Implications for
Tax Policy: A Reply, 44 LAND ECON. 414, 416 (1968):
The impersonal forces of the market, in effect, have established a "horizontal
equity" with respect to all ownership costs. Given the American predilection to
let the market be the final arbitrator in such matters, it is difficult to advocate
horizontal equity as a taxation principal (sic] where other ownership costs
are involved, the almost universal case.
153 Berney & Larson, Micro-Analysis of Mobile Home Characteristics with Implica-
tions for Tax Policy: Rejoinder, 44 LAND ECON. 417 (1968).
154 For a discussion see HoDES & RoBEasON 110-19; Carter, supra note 6, at 51-55;
Note, supra note 140, at 715-19.
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home on his land, places it on a foundation, and connects it to utilities,
it is not difficult to say that he intended to make it part of the realty. 55
It then follows that the value of the home should be assessed for real
estate tax purposes and taxed accordingly. Some statutes make this
distinction explicitly.15 On the other hand, where mobile homes are
placed in mobile home parks operated as such, the question arises as
to who is to be taxed and how the tax is to be enforced
5 7
For purposes of administrative convenience and ease of collection,
statutes that undertake to tax mobile homes in parks as realty add
the assessed value of the homes to the land and impose the tax as
a lien on the land or a liability of the owner of the park.158 The
validity of such taxes has been challenged by individual park owners
and by associations of mobile home park operators; generally the
ground is that imposing a tax on A for property owned by B is a denial
of due process.159 The early cases, either those construing general stat-
utes and struggling with terms such as "attached," "permanently af-
fixed," and "being part of the real estate," 180 or those dealing with
specific statutes mentioning mobile homes as such,1 " were confused.
Such cases are collected and analyzed in the existing literature, and
the articles give an idea of the state of the law prior to 1961.162 How-
ever, decisions in New York and Pennsylvania have forcefully answered
most of the objections and seem to indicate the trend of judicial think-
ing.
155 Eg., Crawford v. Wesleyville, 68 Pa. D. & C. 215 (1949). It is interesting to note
that apparently the assessor of King County refused to enter the mobile home involved
in State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 212, 449 P.2d 806 (1969), on the county tax rolls. Brief for
Respondent at 2, State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 212, 449 P.2d 806 (1969).
156 E.g., Micu. STAT. ANN. § 7.2(1) (1960); WAsf. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.50.180(5)
(Supp. 1967).
157 E.g., Carter, supra note 6, at 51-55; Note, supra note 140, at 712-19.
158 For example, chapter 726 of New York Laws of 1954 provided that mobile
homes "shall be assessed to the owners of the real property on which they are located."
This statute was subsequently amended to read, "shall be included in the assessment of
the land on which it is located . N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw § 102(12)(g) (Mc-
Kinney 1960).
159 See discussion in Carter, supra note 6, at 53-55.
180 E.g., Erwin v. Farrington, 285 App. Div. 1212, 140 N.Y.S.2d 379 (4th Dep't
1955); Stewart v. Carrington, 203 Misc. 543, 119 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Mason Appeal,
75 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1950); Streyle v. Board of Property Assessment, 173 Pa. Super. 324, 98
A.2d 410 (1953).
161 E.g., New York State Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Steckel, 208 Misc. 308, 144 N.Y.S2d
82 (Sup. Ct. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 3 App. Div. 2d 643, 158 N.Y.S.2d 179 (4th Dep't
1956); Hartman v. Fulton County, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 611 (1960).
162 Carter, supra note 6, at 46-57; Note, Regulation and Taxation of House Trailers,
22 U. Cm. L REv. 738, 745-51 (1955); Note, supra note 140, at 705-10.
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The objections to this kind of legislation were analyzed by the
New York Court of Appeals in New York Mobile Homes Association
v. Steckel.163 The contention that mobile homes could not be taxed
or classified as realty was easily brushed aside. The court repeated a
well-established principle that questions of classification are basically
for the legislature, so long as there is a reasonable ground for the
distinction.' 4 The court saw no incongruity in treating immobilized
mobile homes used as residences as part of the freehold. As to the
contention that the mobile home park operators would be forced to
pay taxes on another person's property, the court properly pointed out
that they have an easy means of recouping such amounts in the form
of increased rent.165 Indeed, because of the vagaries of the Internal
Revenue Code, the unfairness, if any, is to the owner of the mobile
home rather than to the mobile home park operator. Since the tax
is imposed on the operator or his land, it is he who can deduct it
for income tax purposes.166 At the same time the tax is passed on to
the owner of the home in the form of increased rent which, being
a personal expense, is not deductible.
The validity of taxation of mobile homes as realty to the owner
of the land was also upheld in principle in Lantz Appeal.16 7 The
language of the Pennsylvania statute was at that time less explicit
than that of New York's, and the court's main problem was to deter-
mine at what point the mobile home became "permanently attached
to land."'168 Therefore, legally there seems to be no impediment to the
taxation of mobile homes on parity with other forms of housing.169
163 9 N.Y.2d 533, 175 N.E.2d 151, 215 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369
U.S. 150 (1962).
164 Id. at 538, 175 N.E.2d at 153, 215 N.Y.S2d at 490.
165 Id. at 539, 175 N.E.2d at 154, 215 N.Y3S.2d at 491. See also Berney & Larson,
supra note 16, at 458-62.
166 INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 164(a)(1).
167 199 Pa. Super. 310, 184 A.2d 127 (1962).
168 Id. at 814, 184 A.2d at 129.
169 At first blush there seems to be an inconsistency in our advocacy of taxing
mobile homes at a parity with other forms of housing and our earlier statements that
mobile homes may play a role in the provision of adequate housing for the poor. The
apparent inconsistency is that if taxes on mobile homes are adjusted, this would increase
the costs of this kind of housing and make it that much harder for the less affluent
to afford. This, in effect, is the thrust of Professor Rooney's articles. Rooney, supra note
152, at 415-16. However, we believe that the best way to help certain people is not to
release them from some taxes and thereby increase the tax burdens of others similarly
situated.
As indicated above, all available studies clearly show that the solution to the housing
problems of the poor cannot be achieved without a massive investment of public funds.




The mobile home is here to stay,170 whether in its present form
or in the form of modular prefabricated housing. The trend in the
past ten or fifteen years has been towards decreased mobility and in-
creased livability. Many of our zoning and taxing laws date from
a time when the house trailer was a makeshift contraption not really
fit for permanent human habitation. These laws increasingly have no
relationship to reality and should be revised. The concept of mobile
home living is receiving more and more public support and unjus-
tified discrimination against this mode of housing should end. On the
other hand, there is no reason why dwellers in mobile homes should
get a form of public subsidy through lower taxation. People who live
in mobile homes should pay their fair share of local taxes.
Rapid developments in the field of mobile homes and modular
construction will create, in the foreseeable future, additional problems,
many of them legal. The question of jobs, crafts, and employment will
be involved, as has already been evidenced by differences between the
Detroit Building Trades Council on one side and the Teamsters and
United Automobile Workers on the other.171 The question of whether
of housing from taxes has only the effect of throwing greater tax burdens on others,
many of whom may be essentially in the same economic position. Furthermore, using
this form of subsidy to benefit the poor is inefficient because of its indiscriminate appli-
cation to many who can afford to carry their fair share of taxation. As all the studies
indicate, mobile home dwellers are at least as well off as the average population and
may be a little bit above the median. Berney & Larson, supra note 16, at 454-58; French
& Hadden, supra note 14, at 135-38. As has been forcefully argued, tax incentives may
not be the best or most economical means of achieving social ends in the field of hous-
ing. Stone, TaxIncentives as a Solution to Urban Problems, 10 Wx. & MARY L. REv.
647 (1969). But see Berger, supra note 24, at 34; cf. Gabinet & Coffey, Housing Partner-
ships: Shelters from Taxes and Shelters for People, 20 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 723, 773-
75B (1969). For a critical analysis of tax incentives in general, see Surrey, Tax Incentives
as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HAZv. L. Rrv. 705 (1970).
170 Developments are very rapid. For example, on August 13, 1969, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board announced that it proposed to amend the regulations applicable to
federal savings and loan associations (by addition of § 545.7-1 to title 12 of the Code
of Federal Regulations) to permit such associations to make loans on the security of
mobile homes, not to exceed 5% of their assets. 34 Fed. Reg. 13115 (1969).
171 Teamsters Local 299 signed an agreement with Pre-Built Homes, Inc., a manu-
facturer of prefabricated housing, to represent all of its employees, many of whom were
to be drawn from the unemployed of the inner city. This drew an angry protest from
the Detroit Building Trades Council. The Detroit News, Sept. 30, 1969, at 10-A, col. 1.
Earlier in the year, Walter P. Reuther, President of the United Automobile Workers,
traded accusations and recriminations with Jack Wood, Managing Director of the Detroit
Building Trades Council, and C. J. Haggerty, National Building Trades Council President.
The Detroit News, June 3, 1969, at 16-A, col. 4.
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a mobile home is chattel or land will increasingly arise, not only in
connection with zoning or restrictive covenants, but also in other fields
such as secured transactions. 172 The forthcoming revolution in con-
struction will require a thorough rethinking and revision of building
codes and similar enactments. 73 We hope that these areas will soon
be explored and a discussion initiated.
172 In the secured transactions field the problems are perfection of security, priority,
and liquidation. The experiences with § 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code have not
been happy. See, e.g., Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money
Collateral: A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem under Section 9-313 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 73 YALE LJ. 788, 794-95 (1964). Recently, Professor Shanker
amplified his views in a letter, dated June 6, 1969, to the Review Committee for Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in connection with Preliminary Draft No. 1 of the
proposed revision of § 9-313.
173 California has just passed a law making a factory-built house that meets state
specifications eligible to be placed anywhere in the state. Mayer, supra note 27, at 146.
